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1. Introduction
Corruption continues to be a central issue in the governance of institutions (public, private
or mixed) -a phenomenon that costs the European economy around 120 billion euros per
year. The World Bank considers anti-corruption as the heart of the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals and achieving the targets set for Financing for Development.1 The lack of
a generalized theoretical foundation and ambiguous effects of many initiatives to combat
corruption, keep this issue as a very big challenge for both scholars and practitioners. Big
scandals that have been exposed, relating to corruption in governments suggest that cor-
ruption in the government sector is a pressing current issue, which entails dangers to social
cohesion because officers’ unwarranted behavior for personal gains undermines the trust of
the public opinion to governance of institutions.
A common definition of corruption is the misuse of a position of trust or authority for
personal gain rather than for the benefit of the party that bestowed that position (see, e.g.,
[25] and [18]). This misuse of authority usually involves breaking rules ([1]) or protocols.
As empirical evidence suggests, a most prevalent type of corruption is when an authorized
individual accepts a monetary payoff (a bribe) in exchange for taking a specified action that
benefits the donor of the bribe. Recent years have seen a rise in empirical research which
documents such evidence on corruption in various sectors and associates it to variables in
the economic environment. Studies have investigated the amount of bribes paid to police
([19]), judges ([16]), politicians ([24]) and port and border post officials ([23]), or the value
of political connection on firms’ stock price (e.g., [8], [9]) and on loans ([12]).
A crucial aspect of bribery situations is the information that the parties involved have
about one another. For instance, the bribe that one party is willing to accept and the
other is willing to pay. Uncertainty about these parameters could be a major impediment
for the conclusion of such illicit deals because of the unknown benefits of engaging into
such practices. Indeed, in the literature it has been documented that uncertainty reduces
corruption through its effect on the perception of the size of the bribe that would be ac-
ceptable by a corrupt individual ([13], [14]). Other authors have highlighted the effects of
uncertainty about other aspects of a corrupt environment. For example, [22] argue that
under incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one’s potential cor-
ruption partner, bribe donors have an incentive to bid lower and bribe receivers bid higher,
1See https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption
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thus reducing the probability that a corrupt transaction occurs in a random matching.
Finally, it has been argued that uncertainty reduces corruption through its effect on the
perception of the probability of being detected ([5], [4]).
We suggest that information has a more profound impact on corruption through adverse
selection effects, i.e., situations where exchanges do not materialize, though they are a pri-
ori possible. Adverse selection occurs when the interest in an exchange unravels because
the value of an exchange is uncertain, leading to a reduction of the willingness to pay
which in turn further reduces the expected value of an exchange and so on. We propose to
follow this lead inspired by the lessons we have learned from such ’market failures’. Our
main message here is this: as economists we have identified situations where exchange fails
and these can be exploited to work for us against corruption. In this way indirect anti-
corruption measures can be developed around the idea of ’managing’ uncertainty in order
to trigger severe adverse selection effects which will unravel bribery temptations. Such
measures can be very effective because they operate as anti-corruption tools through self
interest rather than through enforcement, i.e., they are ’soft power’ policy tools. 2
Some authors have used similar ideas in other contexts. For example, [11] and [15] use such
failures to inhibit exchange in illicit markets. The former established a search-theoretical
model in which low switching cost induces a moral hazard problem between sellers and
buyers and obtained a unique equilibrium where a mass of sellers always chose quick one-
time profit and offer zero quality drugs.3 The latter builds a model of illicit trade of credit
data in an online forum and the reputation system that sustains trade. He proposes to
penetrate the market with a number of sellers who cheat and a number of buyers who
slander the seller so that both the market clearing price and the quantity of data provided
drop. However, both the quality of drugs and the authenticity of credit data are tangible
trade objects. By contrast, what a bribe is paid for is often indefinite.
In pursuing this direction we must flesh out the idea of ’managing uncertainty’. By this
we mean to use variables under the control of the authorities, which in the presence of
uncertainty would affect the expected cost-benefit analysis of a bribe, in a way that gen-
erates adverse selection effects. The variables which are relevant in order to achieve this,
2As discussed below, these measures can also be effective in related contexts of moral hazard.
3However, in [17] it is demonstrated how decentralized trade may ameliorate the average quality of the
goods traded.
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the way they are intertwined as well as the way to choose them is much of the purpose
of the present paper. We develop the idea of triggering failures of bribery in a committee
decision setting. This is a promising way to fight corruption especially when a decision of
a project or policy, e.g., the location of the new city center, or the financial budget plan for
the next year and so on, involves values which may be far beyond the pay scales of officers
who are responsible for making such decisions. We show that the interest to bribe could
completely unravel if the number of (types of) individuals are chosen appropriately so that
the average contribution of each group of (types of) individuals becomes smaller than the
bribe necessary to corrupt them. In line with the literature our model also incorporates
some relevant variables such as salaries, monitoring, punishment etc, which influence the
context under which adverse selection happens. Instead of doing comparative studies on
the effectiveness of salary increases or monitoring, we combine these anti-corruption tools
together with adverse selection. In what follows we present a simple model of a bribery
game which illustrates our point.
2. Corruption Decisions
In standard models of corruption, officers are assumed to perform a certain action and may
receive a bribe in order to switch to another action. In this way a bribe can be understood
as a ’contract’ where a monetary payoff is associated with a certain distortion. However,
the actions performed by officers in absence of a bribe often vary. For instance not all offi-
cers perform their duties with the same diligence. At the same time, there may be several
possible alternative actions that an officer can be bribed to take. Hence, when specifying
an action to be taken in return for a monetary payoff, the distortion associated with the
bribe may vary across individuals.
We build a model below which departs from the standard framework, by allowing officers
to vary both with respect to the actions they perform when they are not corrupt and the
actions they would be willing to take for a given bribe. In our model officers are faced
with a range of alternative actions over which they can choose and may be bribed for.
Individuals’ heterogeneity in characteristics, such as ethics, risk preference, or education
background, are captured by their most preferred action when they are ’honest’, i.e., when
they act under no influence or temptation. This can be understood as the diligence by
which they perform their duty.
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Another principle of our model is that the bribes offered are associated with an objective,
a purpose, which must be accomplished by influencing the action of an individual who is
at the authorized position. The key to our modeling is that the difference between individ-
uals’ most preferred action when they are honest and the action that they take when they
accept a bribe is precisely what the bribe is paid for. In other words, bribes are exchanged
for distortion of actions. Therefore, this difference determines the various amounts of bribe
necessary for different individuals to participate into corruption and, at the same time, the
different amount of bribe that the donor is willing to pay to different individuals.
By way of formalizing these ideas we view ’officers’ summarized in a set I as confronted
with a range of alternative choices corresponding to an interval [x, z] ∈ <. For example, the
interval [x, z] may correspond to alternative locations of a public project (e.g. a library) or a
level of penalty to be imposed on an offender. Another interesting interpretation is to think
of points in the interval as corresponding to randomizations between two choices x and z,
representing the probability that an officer would adopt each of the choices. Each officer
receives a monetary income w > 0 and chooses y ∈ [x, z]. The officer’s preferences over the
available choices are represented by a utility function uh(y, w), which is twice continuously
differentiable, bounded and strictly concave in y. We assume that D2yuh < 0 and Dwuh > 0.
For each h ∈ I, let xh ∈ [x, z] denote the most preferred action, i.e., uh(xh, w) > uh(y, w),
∀y ∈ [x, z]. For any given y 6= xh, one can compute the (additional) income necessary
so that the officer is indifferent between xh and y: uh(xh, w) = uh (y, w +Bh(y)). This
income Bh(y) represents the minimum bribe necessary to induce the officer to substitute
xh for y.
4 The function Bh(y) is akin to the ’reservation bribe’ in the literature.
5
Corruption on behalf of the officer is understood as the acceptance of a monetary payoff
b ≥ Bh(y) in order to substitute their preferred action xh for y, i.e., for distorting their
action by |xh − y|. Here lies the crucial point in our approach: the monetary payoff b, by
inducing the action y has been effectively traded for the distortion |xh− y|, which depends
on the individual who accepts the bribe. In other words a given monetary payoff ’buys’ a
4For simplicity we have not included the probability of detection and the corresponding punishment.
This can be easily added by considering the expected utility weighting the utilities of receiving a bribe and
of being punished, with the probability of detection. The reservation bribe Bh(y) can be just as well defined
in this case.
5Though we will not make use of it in this paper, generally this model allows for a much richer class of
bribing ’contracts’, so it can handle the possibility that the donor of a bribe can choose strategically both
the monetary payoff and the action required.
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variable distortion of the action when given to different officers, hence the ’value for money’
to the donor depends on the individual who accepts the bribe. This latter observation has
some very interesting implications regarding the emergence of corruption as we establish
in the next section.
3. Corruption and adverse selection in a strategic game
Let us proceed to embed the model we developed in the last section to a strategic context
involving bribing. Consider two sets of players, a donor and a set of officers I. An officer
h ∈ I can be represented by the pair (xh, Bh), as per the analysis above. We assume that
the set I can be partitioned into types in a finite set P = {(xt, Bt) : t = 1, 2 . . . , T}, i.e.,
that there is a mapping c : I → P .
Let us consider the following situation. A choice of an element of [x, z] will be decided col-
lectively by a committee (say a ’jury’) H ⊂ I of officers, each of whom proposes an element
in this interval and the committee decision is derived as the average of the proposed points,
representing a consensus where proposals of members carry equal weight. We assume that
the procedure is transparent so the proposals of each officer are publicly observable.
Suppose now that the decision of this committee affects the welfare of the donor, who
prefers points in the direction of z. For simplicity we assume that z > x(ch) for each h ∈ I,
i.e., a point further away from the preferred element of each officer, so that in principle
the donor would be interested in bribing each officer. Hence, the donor is interested in as
many officers as possible proposing the element z, so that the decision (the average) is as
close to z as possible. Accordingly the donor may offer to pay a total bribe bill b ≥ 0 to
those officers who agree to propose the action z in return.
Corruption is understood here as officers changing their proposal from their most preferred
point x(ch) to z, in exchange for a monetary payoff. For instance, in the example where
the decision concerns the location of a public library, a member of the committee is cor-
rupt if they receive a bribe in return for changing their proposal from their most preferred
location to z. Similarly, in the example where the committee decision regards the penalty
to an offender, a member of the committee is corrupt if they receive a bribe in return for
changing their proposal from what they consider an appropriate penalty (x(ch)) to z.
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The donor’s strategy set can be taken to be Sd = <+. Officers on the other hand receive a
salary w and may either accept or reject the bribe offer. The decision to accept or reject
a bribe is identified with the strategy set {0, 1}, where th = 1 (th = 0) corresponds to
’accept’ (’reject’). Those who accept, i.e., th = 1 propose the point z and those who don’t,
i.e., th = 0, propose their most preferable point x(ch). In return those officers who accept
will split the bribe amongst themselves and those who reject simply receive their salary w.
In other words, given a profile of strategies th ∈ {0, 1} for each h ∈ H, each officer receives
a kickback th∑
h∈H th
b, where 0/0 is defined to equal zero.
The key in this setup is that the donor offers a bribe bill to those who agree to switch
their proposal to z, but is oblivious to what these officers would have proposed in absence
of a bribe, i.e., how far the bribe changes their proposal. In other words since the bribe
is shared equally between corrupt officers who are heterogenous, some of them receive a
payoff which is higher than the minimum required in order to switch their proposal to z.
At the same time the distortion of the proposals (and hence their value to the donor) varies
among the corrupt officers, yet they receive the same bribe.
Let us consider a game that proceeds sequentially. In the first stage, the donor may offer a
bribe bill. Then, the second stage contemplates a simultaneous move subgame among the
officers in which each one may (or may not) accept to be bribed. A behavioral strategy for
individuals is then a mapping sh : Sd → {0, 1}. Let Sh denote the collection of behavioral
strategies of individual h and S =
∏
h∈H Sh. Once strategies are executed the payoffs to
the donor and individuals respectively are as follows:
(1) pid(b, t) =
1
#H
∑
h∈H
[thz + (1− th)x(ch)]− b
(2) pih(b, t) = thu(ch, w +
1∑
h∈H th
b, z) + (1− th)u(ch, w, xch)
Notice that in expression (1) when th = 1 (th = 0) the corresponding officer has (not) signed
up to the bribe and proposes the point z (x(ch)). The interpretation is that the payoff
to the donor depends on the average of the proposals by all officers.6 Correspondingly, in
6For simplicity, we assumed that the donor’s value of a unit distance is V = 1. This represents a
normalization of monetary units in terms of V . In fact, one can identify the interval [x, z] with [0, 1] so that
when th = 1 for all h ∈ H, then pid(b,1H) = V − b.
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expression (2) when th = 1 (th = 0) the corresponding individual has (not) signed up to
the bribe and receives the ’corrupt’ (’honest’) payoff u(ch, w+
1∑
h∈H th
b, z) (u(ch, w, x(ch))).
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a collection of strategies (b, s) ∈ Sb × S, which form a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the two-stage game with payoffs as defined
above.
Such an equilibrium is characterized by a set of individuals7 C = {h ∈ H : sh(b) = 1}. The
corresponding payoffs to the donor and individuals are respectively:
(3) pid(b, s) =
1
#H
#Cz + ∑
h∈H\C
x(ch)
− b
(4) pih(b, s) = u(ch, w +
1
#C
b, z), h ∈ C
(5) pih(b, s) = u(ch, w, x(ch)), h ∈ H \ C
Equation (3) shows that the profit of the donor increases the more individuals take the
action z instead of their fallback action x(ch). Therefore, the donor’s payoff is increasing
when more officers accept the bribe and choose z.
We proceed to explore a few facts about SPNE in this game, which for expositional pur-
poses we state as elementary lemmas.
Proposition 1. For any b ∈ Sb there is s(b) ∈ S which is a Nash equilibrium in the second
stage of the game.
Proof : see the Appendix.
The proof of this proposition traces an intuitive way to identify an equilibrium in the sec-
ond stage of the game, but this need not be unique. Indeed, it is possible that several
different groups of individuals may corrupt for a proposed bribe b. An example may help
to clarify this.
Example 1. Consider a set of individuals {1, 2, 3, 4} with reservation bribes corresponding
to two types as follows: B(c1, z) = 1, B(ci, z) = 3 for i = 2, 3, 4.
7We assume that when u(ch, w +
1∑
h∈H th
b, z) = u(ch, w, x(ch)), then sh(b) = 1.
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-For b ≥ 12 the whole group C = {1, 2, 3, 4} being corrupt is the only Nash equilibrium in
the second stage.
-For 9 ≤ b < 12 there are three Nash equilibria, where any three member group including
individual 1 could conceivably be corrupt: C1 = {1, 2, 3}, C2 = {1, 2, 4} and C3 = {1, 3, 4},
where individuals receive a bribe b3 each, which is at least equal to their respective reserva-
tion bribes.
-For 6 ≤ b < 9 there are three Nash equilibria, where any two member group including
individual 1 could conceivably be corrupt: C1 = {1, 2}, C2 = {1, 3} and C3 = {1, 4} with
individuals receiving a bribe of b2 each, which is at least equal to their respective reservation
bribes.
-For 1 ≤ b < 6 the only Nash equilibrium is where individual 1 is corrupt: C = {1}.
-For b < 1 the only Nash equilibrium is where no individual is corrupt.
This example also demonstrates how unraveling happens as we go down the possible bribe
values. Observe that the individual with the lowest reservation bribe is always included in
every corrupt group. Agents with higher reservation bribes would drop out of any corrupt
group as we lower the bribe payment.8
It should be noted that the benefit derived by the donor depends on which group would
occur in the second stage of the game. It is this fact that affects the cost-benefit consider-
ations of the donor. On the other hand, the exercise for anti-corruption authorities is to
setup the membership of players in the game, in a way so that the group of individuals
that the donor might find interesting to corrupt is minimized and ideally empty. In order
to see how this may be possible, let us proceed to establish some facts about the equilibria
of this game.
The following lemma establishes the fact that at an equilibrium the payoff to the donor
should be at least as high as that they would receive without bribing. If one views the ’no
bribe’ payoff as the reservation payoff for the donor, this lemma establishes the corruption
participation incentive constraint for the donor.
Lemma 1. (Individual rationality) At a SPNE the following must hold:
(6) pid(b, s(b)) ≥ 1
#H
∑
h∈H
x(ch)
Proof : see the Appendix.
8One could extend the model and assign beliefs on the possible groups that can form a Nash equilibrium
for each bribe bill. This would make expected payoffs symmetric for each player type. In the interest of
simplicity, we do not pursue this argument here.
CORRUPTION AND ADVERSE SELECTION 9
The next lemma establishes the corruption participation incentive constraint for the officers.
Lemma 2. (Corruption participation constraint) At a SPNE where b > 0 the following
must hold:
(7)
1
#C
b ≥ B(ch, z), ∀h ∈ C
Proof : see the Appendix.
Finally the last lemma establishes that at equilibrium, since all corrupt officers receive the
same monetary payoff some of them receive a higher payoff than the minimum required in
order to propose the action desired by the donor.
Lemma 3. (Effect of type variety) Define BC = max{B(ch, z) : h ∈ C}. At a SPNE where
b > 0 the following must hold:
(8) b = (#C)BC
Proof : see the Appendix.
The conclusions of the last three lemmas give rise to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. At a SPNE the payoffs for the donor and individuals are respectively
(9) pid(b, s) =
1
#H
#Cz + ∑
h∈H\C
x(ch)
− (#C)BC
(10) pih(b, s) =
{
u(ch, w +BC , z), h ∈ C
u(ch, w, x(ch)), h ∈ H \ C
From the view point of anti-corruption policy, the objective is to form a committee in a way
that restricts corruption. The advantage of the policy maker relative to a potential donor
of a bribe is that as a regular employer the policy maker may have a better knowledge of
the individual’s type whereas the latter is oblivious to it. In addition the authorities have
the advantage of selecting the membership and population of the committee. Building on
this premise we explain how the choice of a committee can be done in a way so that the
desired restriction of corruption can be achieved by exploiting adverse selection effects.
The idea is to select the individuals H who participate in the game, in a way that mimics
the conditions of the ’market for lemons’, in order to trigger the desired unraveling effects.
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By renaming types if necessary we may sort the types in descending order as follows:
z − x(1) > z − x(2) > . . . > z − x(T ). For each A ⊆ T denote x(A) = min{x(t) : t ∈ A}
and BA = max{B(t, z) : t ∈ A}9 and associate the smallest natural number NA so that
z − x(A)
BA
< NA
Finally, let us select a set of individuals H ⊆ c−1(T ) such that #H ≥ N = max{NA : A ⊆
T}. The following proposition verifies that this procedure results in a set of individuals for
whom bribery collapses.
Proposition 2. (Complete unraveling) The unique SPNE occurs for b = 0. Moreover, for
all h ∈ H,
(11) sh(b) =
{
0 b = 0
sh(b) b > 0
where equilibrium function s(b) is defined in the proof of lemma (1).
Proof : see the Appendix.
In some cases one might be interested in ensuring that certain (types of) members in a
committee are immune to bribing. This could be the case if the planner was facing some
constraints in forming a committee. The following proposition shows along the same lines
that it is possible to form a committee in such a way that certain targeted types are
insulated from being corrupt in any outcome of the game. Suppose that the planner is
interested in making sure that individuals of certain types T ′ ⊂ T in the committee are
not bribed. Consider H ′ ⊆ c−1(T ) where #H ′ ≥ N = max{NA : A ⊆ T ′}. The following
proposition can be proved along the same lines.
Proposition 3. (Partial unraveling) For any SPNE (b, s) ∈ Sb × S where b > 0, we have
that {h ∈ H ′ : sh(b) = 1} ∩ T ′ = ∅, i.e., only individuals of types T \ T ′ can be bribed at
any equilibrium.
4. Discussion
The model considered above is an example of how adverse selection effects can be exploited
to the advantage of anti-corruption authorities. Proposition (2) is akin to Akerlof’s un-
raveling of the ’lemons market’, albeit in a strategic framework. A key element in the
above setting is that all the officers who choose to be corrupt share the bribe equally.
9Note that the type corresponding to x(A) (the most ’valuable’ type) need not be the same as the type
corresponding to BA (the type most ’expensive to corrupt’).
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This can be understood to reflect the classical scenario that the equal bribes amongst cor-
rupt individuals represents the inability of the donor to distinguish across types of officers.
Therefore, the donor signals a single monetary payoff to every individual, oblivious as to
their actual type and hence the value of their service, i.e., how close or far their preferred
proposal would be to the one desired by the donor. In other words, the officers whose most
preferred proposal is close to the one required by the donor, obtain the same amount of
bribe as the officers whose most preferred proposal is far away from it. At the same time
some officers receive a monetary payoff which is higher than the minimum bribe required
in order to induce them to choose the proposal required by the donor.
Another scenario consistent with an equal split of the bribe, is when the donor has no
direct access to individual officers in a committee. In such a context all the donor can do
is to signal a total bribe bill to be shared equally among all committee members willing to
switch their proposals. Similarly as in the previous scenario the donor is a priori oblivious
as to which group of committee members will sign up to the deal and consequently as to
the exact benefit they will derive.
Either way donors have to form expectations about the possible benefit they will derive
from a bribe. The upshot is that if the membership of the committee has been appropri-
ately chosen in terms of types and population, the expected benefit from any bribe level
does not outweigh the cost so any bribe attempt is deemed ultimately self-defeating. In
short, the role of uncertainty in a committee decision setting can be exploited by the au-
thorities to fine tune the situation so that the temptation to corruption collapses. From the
policy makers’ viewpoint the message of our analysis is that when a committee is formed to
deal with an issue involving values which may be far beyond the pay scales of its members,
then the numbers and types of members of the committee become important in avoiding
corruption. Rotation of committee members is a measure that serves the purpose of creat-
ing uncertainty about the types of officers but the distribution of types and numbers in the
membership of the committee is also very important in order to trigger adverse selection
effects.
The heterogeneity which is responsible for the unraveling of bribing in the game presented
in the previous section, originates from two sources. First, from the varying ’reservation
bribes’ of individuals, which reflect the different moral codes or other ethical inhibitions
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of officers. This is in line with the existing literature. Second, from the varying preferred
actions of officers in absence of bribing. This is a novelty proposed in this paper, which
is based on the intuition that officers have some discretion over the actions that they take
while performing their tasks in absence of any influence. For instance, more often than not,
the definition of an official task (or the rules of conduct) is very general and so it allows for
a range of actions, over which the officer has discretion and is expected to make a judge-
ment. Even in cases where a task is precisely defined so there is no room for maneuvering
over the actions to be taken, it could be argued that not all officers execute their task with
the same diligence.
In the literature, officers are distinguished between corrupt or not and act the same inside
these two groups. By contrast our model introduces differences among officers in both
groups. On one hand, officers who are not corrupt do not necessarily have the same most
preferred action. As already mentioned these differences determine the different contri-
bution of officers to the donor when they choose to be corrupt. On the other hand, any
point in the officer’s range of actions could be targeted by the donor, i.e., the donor could
strategically choose the action they require from corrupt officials. This is a possibility in
our model, although we did not make use of it in this paper.
It would be useful to draw a distinction here from the problem of ’moral hazard’, which
is also associated with lack of information. This problem arises when the action of an
officer is not observable so the donor cannot verify whether or not an officer carried out the
action that they were bribed for. In other words whereas adverse selection refers to lack
of information about the type of an officer (while the action is observable), moral hazard
refers to lack of information about the actions of an officer (but the type is observable).
In the game we developed in the last section we assumed that the proposals of committee
members are observable, so we are clearly in a situation where uncertainty refers to the type
of the officers which is reflected in the reservation bribe Bh and the most preferred point
xh of each officer. This allowed us to focus on the adverse selection effects of uncertainty,
which is the point in this paper. Nevertheless, our setup can accommodate moral hazard
as well under fairly mild assumptions on utility functions. Moral hazard may accentuate
adverse selection effects but keeping the proposals of officers unobservable (for instance
keeping the deliberations of a committee confidential) is often very hard and constrained
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by accountability and transparency requirements.
It is noteworthy that the ’tuning’ required in order to trigger adverse selection effects is re-
lated to variables which have been identified in the literature as relevant to anti-corruption
policies, notably the wage rates10 or the probability of detection and punishment.11 In
our model salaries and monitoring affect the reservation bribe of each type so they are
related to our analysis. This observation suggests that adverse selection effects have to be
considered in conjunction with these strategic tools. Indeed, officers salaries, monitoring,
and punishments will depend on the importance of the project and the ability of the gov-
ernment to detect those briberies.
Finally, by way of comparison the particular example of the ’lemons market’ obtains when:
(a) c−1(t) is singleton for each t ∈ T . (b) The sorting of types with respect to B(c, z) in
descending order is the same as the sorting with respect to z − x(c). In this way for each
A ⊆ T , z−x(A)BA =
z−x(tA)
BtA
for the ’top’ type tA ∈ A. Therefore, one needs to consider only
nested subsets A(r) = T ∩{r, r+ 1, . . . , T}, where r = 1, 2, . . . , T , i.e., each time excluding
the ’top’ type. Once N is chosen12 so that
z−x(tA(r))
BtA(r)
< N we have that in the relevant step
of the proof of proposition (2)
1
N
∑
t∈A(r)
(z − x(t)) < z − x(tA(r)) < (#C)BtA(r) = (#C)BA(r)
for each r = 1, 2, . . . , t and our proof applies.
5. Conclusions
Economics research has mainly focused on the development of methods to control corrup-
tion phenomena, which are based on suitable variables (such as wages, monitoring and
penalties) that directly influence the incentives of individuals. However, anti-corruption
measures can be devised by influencing the environment in which individuals operate and
thus curb temptations to engage in corrupt practices in an indirect way. In particular, since
such illicit transactions often require to evaluate uncertainties about the characteristics of
the individuals involved, authorities could show some creativity by devising anti-corruption
strategies which take advantage of the detrimental effects of adverse selection.
10See [3], [2] and [6] who advocate salary increases, but also [26], [21] or [10] who cast doubts as to their
effectiveness.
11See [20] who points out the drawbacks of such policies.
12In this case N refers to number of types.
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In order to substantiate this view, we offered a stylized model of bribery of groups of in-
dividuals in a committee or jury, which is another departure from the literature. Indeed,
the existing literature views bribing as a contractual situation between a donor and one
individual who is potentially corrupt. By contrast we focus on situations where a bribe is
a multi-agent contract between a donor and a group of individuals. Circumstances which
correspond to our setup, i.e., where donors attempt to influence decision making by com-
mittees, are quite prevalent in reality and so worthwhile of some attention by the corruption
literature. As we saw in this paper these situations involve consideration of multi-agent
incentives, so they require some creative thinking because they are not well covered by the
standard anti-corruption recipes. The present paper is by no means exhaustive but rather
a step in pursuing this line of studying anti-corruption.
We considered that officers may act heterogeneously when they are not corrupt, which
blurs the cost-benefit analysis of corrupting them. This leads naturally to the idea that
the uncertainty about the benefit of corrupting alternative groups of (types of) officers
can be ‘managed’ in order to serve as anti-corruption tool. As shown above, it may be
possible to condition the situation in such a way so that the adverse selection effects take a
severe form that completely unravels bribe attempts. We believe that other known market
failures lend themselves to such ideas, so this is a line worthwhile pursuing. As economists
we are called to find ways to sustain situations which are against the private interests of
individuals (i.e., minimize exchanges which are mutually beneficial for the parties involved),
which is the opposite of our usual task, but we are well placed to know what it takes to
achieve this outcome.
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let {1, 2, . . . , Tˆ} index c−1(H) (the types of players included in H) in accenting order, i.e.,
B(t, z) < B(t+ 1, z) for t = 1, 2, . . . , Tˆ − 1.
We can partition now the set of players H into subsets Ht = {h ∈ H : B(ch, z) = B(t, z)},
for t = 1, 2, . . . , Tˆ .
We distinguish the following cases:
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Case I: For each b < B(1, z)
In this case consider the strategy profile sh(b) = 0, ∀h ∈ H. Clearly this profile constitutes
a Nash equilibrium in the second stage as no player would have an interest to switch their
strategy because b < B(t, z), for t = 1, 2, . . . , Tˆ .
Case II: For each b ≥ #H ·B(Tˆ , z)
In this case consider the strategy profile sh(b) = 1, ∀h ∈ H. Clearly this profile constitutes
a Nash equilibrium in the second stage as no player would have an interest to switch their
strategy because b#H ≥ B(t, z), for t = 1, 2, . . . , Tˆ .
Case III: For each B(1, z) ≤ b < #H ·B(Tˆ , z)
In this case let tb be the smallest index so that
#
⋃
r≤tb
Hr
B(tb, z) > b
Note that the hypothesis of Case III ensures that such a tb exists.
• If
(
#
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
+ 1
)
B(tb, z) > b then take C =
⋃
r≤tb−1 #Hr. Observe that by the
definition of tb it must be
#C ·B(tb − 1, z) = #
 ⋃
r≤tb−1
Hr
B(tb − 1, z)
≤ b
Define now the strategy profile
(12) sh(b) =
{
1 h ∈ C
0 h 6∈ C
This profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the second stage because
-For h ∈ C: B(ch, z) ≤ B(tb − 1, z) ≤ b#C
-For h 6∈ C: B(ch, z) ≥ B(tb, z) > b#C+1
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so no player has an interest to switch their strategy.
• If
(
#
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
+ 1
)
B(tb, z) ≤ b then identify a subset D ⊂ Htb as follows.
Consider the function f(x) =
(
#
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
+ x
)
B(tb, z)− b, where 0 ≤ x ≤ #Htb .
We have that f(·) is continuous and
f(0) = #
 ⋃
r≤tb−1
Hr
B(tb, z)− b
<
#
 ⋃
r≤tb−1
Hr
+ 1
B(tb, z)− b
≤ 0
f(#Htb) =
#
 ⋃
r≤tb−1
Hr
+ #Htb
B(tb, z)− b
= #
⋃
r≤tb
Hr
B(tb, z)− b
> 0
We conclude that there exists x? ∈ [0,#Htb ] such that f(x?) = 0, i.e.,#
 ⋃
r≤tb−1
Hr
+ x?
B(tb, z) = b
Choose a D ⊂ Htb where13 #D = [x?] and define C =
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
∪D.
Define now the strategy profile
(13) sh(b) =
{
1 h ∈ C
0 h 6∈ C
This profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the second stage because
13We denote by [x] the integer part of x.
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−For h ∈ C : B(ch, z) ≤ B(tb, z)
=
b
#
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
+ x?
≤ b
#
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
+ #D
=
b
#C
−For h 6∈ C : B(ch, z) ≥ B(tb, z)
=
b
#
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
+ x?
>
b
#
(⋃
r≤tb−1Hr
)
+ #D + 1
=
b
#C + 1
so no player has an interest to switch their strategy.
In conclusion, given any b > 0 we can construct for each case a Nash equilibrium profile of
strategies, which concludes our proof 
Proof of Lemma 1:
This follows from the fact that 0 ∈ Sb and the strategy s ∈ S where sh(0) = 0, ∀h ∈ H is
a Nash equilibrium in the second stage game 
Proof of Lemma 2:
This is immediate from the definition of B(ch, z). By definition of the set C we have that
∀h ∈ C, sh(b) = 1, so it must be
u(ch, w +
1
#C
b, z) ≥ u(ch, w, x) ≡ u(ch, w +B(ch, z), z)
It follows that 1#C b ≥ B(ch, z) 
Proof of Lemma 3:
By lemma (2) we have b ≥ (#C)BC . Suppose that b > (#C)BC .
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Then by choosing (#C)BC ≤ b′ < b, we would still have B(ch, z) ≤ BC ≤ b′(#C) for h ∈ C.
Also, b
′
(#C+1) <
b
(#C+1) < B(ch, z) for h 6∈ C. Therefore {h ∈ H : sh(b′) = 1} = C.
However, in this case pid(b
′, s) > pid(b, s), contradicting the SPNE 
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let (b, s) ∈ Sb × S be a SPNE where b > 0 and denote C = {h ∈ H : sh(b) = 1}. By
lemma (3) it must be b = (#C)BC . Since
1
#C
∑
h∈C(z − x(ch))
BC
=
1
#C
∑
t∈c−1(C) #{h ∈ C : ch = t}(z − x(t))
BC
<
z − x(C)
BC
< N(14)
we have that
1
N
∑
h∈C
(z − x(ch)) < (#C)BC
It follows that
1
N
∑
h∈H\C
x(ch) +
1
N
∑
h∈C
(z − x(ch)) < (#C)BC + 1
N
∑
h∈H\C
x(ch)
This inequality can be rearranged as
1
N
∑
h∈H\C
x(ch) +
1
N
∑
h∈C
z − (#C)BC < 1
N
∑
h∈H\C
x(ch) +
1
N
∑
h∈C
x(ch)
Hence, we conclude that
1
N
(#C)z + ∑
h∈H\C
x(ch)
− (#C)BC < 1
N
∑
h∈H
x(ch)
By corollary (1) the left hand side is the equilibrium payoff for the donor, Therefore, the
above inequality implies that
pid(b, s) <
1
N
∑
h∈H x(ch), which contradicts lemma (1) 
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